

Episode 11: Campaigns as Public Action

Speaker 1 [00:00:05] Hi, my name is Luke Bretherton, and this is the Listen Organize Act podcast, which focuses on the history and contemporary practice of organizing in Democratic politics. This episode builds on the previous one by examining the process of identifying an issue, developing a campaign to address that issue and the kinds of public action a successful campaign involves. It's a slightly extended episode as I dig deep into one specific campaign, the Living Wage Campaign and its origins and development in Baltimore in the 1990s to becoming something of a kind of social movement. And I need to preface the conversation by saying what I mean by calling campaigns a form of public action. Campaigns are public action in two senses. They're public in the sense of being a form of shared or common action directed to achieving a good on behalf of the whole neighborhood or city or region. This sense of being public draws on a very ancient definition of politics as that which relates to the RES Publica or Commonwealth or Commonwealth. But they also public in a much more modern sense of being visible, often through deliberately generating media attention. Much of the other work organizing does, for example, building relational power through house meetings and what once is near visible nor very well understood. Outside of those involved in organizing, however, campaigns and the issues they seek to address, for example, better schools, health care, housing or Internet access are much more easily identifiable and legible to a broader public. Yet how organizing develops and conducts campaigns is very different. How many other kinds of campaigns are run, whether that be an election campaign or an advertising campaign? To discuss with me the distinctive approach to campaigns and how they constitute a form of public action that not only wins change, but also builds up a community better able to act for itself rather than simply be acted upon is Jonathan Lange and Janice Fine. Jonathan has been an organizer for over 40 years and worked as both a community and union organizer. Janice is Professor of Labor Studies and Employment Relations at the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University. And prior to becoming an academic, she worked as a community and labor organizer for over 20 years. Professor Jonathan played a key role in the initiation and development of the living wage campaign in Baltimore and elsewhere, and Janice researched and wrote on it extensively. Our Focus on the Living Wage campaign then serves as a case study through which to stage a wider discussion of what campaigns are, how they constitute a form of public action and their broader role in organizing. So joining me now to discuss campaigns and their role in Democratic Change. So, Jonathan, it's great to have you here on the Listen Organize Act podcast. Thank you so much for talking to me today. We're here to discuss campaigns and focus on the role of campaigns as public action in the work of organizing. And you've both been very involved in the living wage campaign specifically. And so I want to begin with that. And we're going to use that campaign as a kind of prism to discuss the role of campaigns in organizing more generally and what they involve and how they can bring about democratic change. So, Jonathan, just as a little bit of backdrop, can you give us a sense of the development of the living wage, a living wage campaign, and set that in the context of Baltimore in the 1990s and the state of organizing work in the city at that time?

Speaker 2 [00:03:59] Well, it kind of goes before Baltimore. And in other words, the union I worked for, the clothing workers, had a close relationship with the Industrial Areas Foundation and had a contract to do some cooperative organizing with them in the 19 in the 1980s. So there was a there was a campaign to join a campaign to organize the remainder of the Leevi shops in Texas. And there was a strong relationship between the clothing workers and the IAF in the Southeast, where a fellow named Gary Ferrars was the regional director. And I quickly realized that I couldn't teach myself how to organize. I

thought I was really smart and everything, but it was hard to this was a hard thing to learn without guidance and coaching, and I needed help and the union wasn't really prepared to help me learn. So I quickly volunteered and they also chose me to be the kind of liaison between the clothing workers and the IAF. And I took a leave of absence from the from the clothing workers and went to work in in nineteen eighty five with East Brooklyn congregations as an organizer. And so I went back after that experience back to Tennessee to to try to take IAF experience and apply it to union organizing. And we did a lot of interesting campaigning there, but nobody paid any attention to it. So in nineteen ninety one Arnie Graf invited me to come up to Baltimore to take what we had learned about applying IAF methodology to union organizing and to it in Baltimore. And that was really the genesis of the of the living wage. We wanted to do it where there was a much, much stronger IAF organization that could provide cover and political help in building an organization and not so not do it in rural Mississippi where nobody was paying attention to what we were doing. Tell me a little bit

Speaker 1 [00:05:58] about Baltimore by the 1990s because, well, on its way to deindustrialization and all the kind of issues that were going on across American urban, particularly across the north, former industrial towns in the states at that time, and a lot of the new jobs emerging in the context, in that context were in the service sector, which I read. Some of these were once described as urban sharecropping. Can you say a bit more about the conditions of employment and what you learn from the stories involved that you heard of those involved in the campaign about the working conditions and their experiences against the backdrop of Baltimore at that time?

Speaker 2 [00:06:41] So Baltimore had been in steady decline since the nineteen eighties, probably a little earlier than that. I mean, the boom of the Port of Baltimore, which had been so important to the development of the city, postwar, had been over for quite some time. So by the 80s, the city was in decline. Manufacturing jobs, which had peaked during the Second World War, were in terrible decline. By 1980, they accounted for only about 15 percent of all employment. And the recession of the early 80s was very severe. And not just not just confined to manufacturing. So between 1970 and nineteen eighty five, Baltimore had lost about forty thousand manufacturing jobs, a decline of about forty five percent. And over the five year period, just between nineteen seventy nine and nineteen eighty five. Employment and the key industrial sectors of transportation, equipment, manufacturing and shipbuilding and ship repair again declined by like 50 percent. So in addition to that, there was this huge decline in public sector jobs. So you had this kind of double whammy of the decline of manufacturing and the decline of public sector jobs. And then you had the redevelopment of the Baltimore Inner Harbor and sort of the promised land of jobs, except that as Jonathan and Arnie. And so many of their of their organizers and researchers lifted up the jobs that were created were terrible. So in their work to organize the workers that we're in the sort of downtown black community and I should just mention, right, that Baltimore you can't really talk about Baltimore and about Baltimore had incredibly radical segregation. And and it was sort of the city that was looked to in terms of how to do racist housing segregation policy nationally. Right. It was it was that it was the state and the city that was looked to as a national model with legislation that was adopted. So there was also this really long history of quite extreme economic segregation. Right. I mean, Baltimore had been thought of as the capital of the right of free blacks in the country. Right. And had the highest number of artisans. And and to stop that, you had to really you have to realize just how intentional that was in Baltimore. So race and and economic devastation kind of intertwined. And what Jonathan and Build were doing was heading into the, you know, the symbol of all of that. And they were organizing African-American workers in inner city Baltimore and, you know, essentially finding that people

who were working full time jobs were making part time wages, they were making low wages. They had no benefits. A lot of them were were having to patronize soup kitchens and shelters for four basic needs.

Speaker 1 [00:09:46] So in that sense, then, of both the kind of broader social conditions that set up that the people having to work multiple jobs were dependent. They they know having paid enough to live. And all that follows from that.

Speaker 2 [00:09:57] And so there was a lot of anger in the African-American community expressed through the institution of the African-American church. And that was that was there. What there wasn't Luke was a real understanding of what the work life and real life of people who were doing this work on a daily basis was. And so and so a lot of the initial work in the campaign was really introducing the activist church members to the low wage workers themselves. And we did it all kinds of ways that turned out to be very, very important to help people really understand what the daily lives of the workers said. Janis describes who were commuting into downtown from east and west Baltimore on the city bus lines and then working at poverty wages, often at night, often very alone, and had no benefits offered to them. And and we're really insulated from typical organizing because typical union organizing, you would have signed these workers up, tried to form a union, may be taken into the National Labor Relations Board and former union and begun negotiating for better wages with their employer. But because they were mostly contracted out either city workers or private sector workers, you couldn't do that because if you raise the wages through the more traditional union methodology, all you were going to do was eliminate that particular contractor from being able to get the next contract because their wages would make them noncompetitive. So we were faced the build and build allies were faced with a serious problem in that traditional union organizing wasn't going to get to the part of the problem.

Speaker 1 [00:11:48] And so, I mean, in some ways it anticipates the world we now live in over the kind of gig economy and. Oh, my God. Yes. And as I this was a kind of precursor. It was

Speaker 2 [00:11:58] foreshadowed. We saw it and and you saw it in the temp agencies was the most. The most vivid place you saw there was a temp agency for a while, a number of the pastors would have Tuesday morning prayer at Brown Memorial Presbyterian Church, and then we would all go down to the largest temp agency in town where next door there was a coffee shop and they would go from table to table doing what they called church and it was church. And we would just hear story after story of stories of people who were put into vans taken out to the to the suburbs, lowered into tanker trucks where they had they had been hauling chemicals with mops and buckets inside of a tanker truck to clean them out and then pulled out for a break maybe and pulled out for lunch maybe, and then taken back downtown. Now, if that person develops the disease, the tanker truck company is not responsible. Who's responsible? So they had really insulated themselves from any sort of typical accountability that employers might feel or have legally to an employee. And that's what that's what we faced. And Janice's numbers we felt on the ground. I mean, everybody had a story about their father who used to work at the GM plant or their father who used to work in the harbor loading ships as a longshoreman. Everybody had a story like that.

Speaker 1 [00:13:37] So it's just building on that then. So what's kind of origin story then of the living wage campaign? How did it emerge out of a process of organizing?

Speaker 2 [00:13:45] Well, we'll start with the name. I took the name from my dad. My dad was this guy who would ask every clerk if she or he made a living wage. So it was a term that I heard all the time and it had fallen. It wasn't I didn't invent it. It fallen out of fashion. So it was the local affiliate and one of our real the IFES flagship organizations. It had been founded in the late 70s. It was built by Arnie Graf and Vernon Thompson, who was kind of the pastor to the pastors in Baltimore. And just a revered guy, an amazing guy and. There were a handful of clergy, along with Arnie Graf, who built this organization and have worked on it was really it was really populated by the veterans of the civil rights movement in Baltimore who found themselves in the nineteen seventies, late seventies and eighties, trying to figure out what to do next. And and the IAF and Ed Chambers and Mike Gecan and Arnie Graf to offer them a way of organizing through the institution that they love the deepest, which was their church. So the campaign had started out originally envisioned as a as a joint campaign between billed and the Service Employees International Union. And they pulled out and left us without funding. And to his credit, Ed Chambers. I mean, the story really is that I had sold my house, I'd given up my job, my wife had quit her job. We had pulled our kids out of school in Knoxville, Tennessee, where I built a little IAF organization. I hired my replacement. And SEIU pulls out of the campaign. I'm sitting there with a half packed U-Haul wondering what I want to do. And Ed Chambers calls me up and says, You want to do it anyway. You want to organize this thing in Baltimore, I'm going to mail you fifty thousand dollars, pay me back. But but that was really the story so that

Speaker 1 [00:15:55] there's quite a lot in the name then. And Janice, I just want to ask you, like, so this notion of a living wage and and what that signifies, obviously in the campaign itself, there's basic issues of survival and justice, which the campaign addresses in this kind of long standing labor emphasis on a fair day's wage for a fair day's work. But could you say there's more at stake in being paid a living wage than just the questions of justice and having enough to live on? There's there's a sense of how the wage is a sign of respect. Can you just talk a little bit around that? In a sense, the relational work that being paid a decent wage does for folk?

Speaker 2 [00:16:37] So I talked earlier about the double whammy of the industrialization and the decline of public sector jobs. But the end of that sentence is those jobs didn't go away. They were just turned into contract jobs. Right. So some of the first organizing that Jonathan was doing was with workers who had previously had these decent blue collar jobs like bus drivers and cafeteria workers. And we were talking to people like Jonathan would take me to these bus yards and to places like that. And I would talk to these people who, you know, this wasn't a distant memory. This was like they went from having a decent blue collar job, which meant, you know, dignity and respect. It meant being able to take a vacation once a year. It meant being able to buy their kids new shoes and new clothes. When the school year started, it meant, you know, kind of thinking of themselves as like aspiring to middle class status. They'd become poor. You know, you ask like, you know, what's the price? And I think for a lot of people. It was it was the level of anxiety and stress and and sort of for that so that mental health issues, it meant drinking. There were just all kinds of like attendant problems. Right. More family issues, more family problems, more broken families. Some of the leaders were working two or three jobs. So it meant that also they just didn't have very much time with their families. And it also meant that everybody was working in the family. Right. The the mom and the dad. So the ability to really be a hands on parent was really impacted. So when they started talking about the living wage, I mean, Jonathan, I'll tell you, but I'll I'll just say, you know, not to be a spoiler, but they think these guys touched off a national movement. That's how powerful. The idea really was, I'll never forget one of our big rallies. One of these workers at Janis's describing. Virginia was her name and Virginia worked at Southern High School as a

custodian, and she's speaking in front of a couple hundred building leaders and other workers in the press and everybody. And she holds up three envelopes. And she says, I work cleaning a high school. And I used to get my pay from the school system. Now my resources come in three envelopes. This is my supplemental welfare benefit. This is my Medicaid because I don't have health insurance anymore. And here this little tiny check comes from the cleaning company I work for. All three envelopes come from the government. Put them in one envelope, stop humiliating me. Yeah, I mean, I'll just say that one of the things that Jonathan did early in the campaign with Kerry Machado and others was they would ride the bus to the end of the line at night and then they would you know, they would bring they would ride the bus with workers as they got off the night shift who were downtown janitors. Right. And they had, you know, in some ways the same story as these privatized workers. Right. Whereas they had been, once upon a time, full time employed by these buildings. Again, decent, you know, janitorial jobs that had lifted generations of people out of poverty. Right. I mean, notwithstanding the fact that black people were typed and there was a racialized job market, which meant they ended up in those jobs disproportionately in the first place, but at least they were, you know, again, family supporting jobs. So then they're going and they're finding these janitors. Basically, their jobs have been redefined as part time jobs. There has been, you know, again, like just this this what was a decent blue collar job had been turned into a part time crappy job and eliminating eliminating any career path. Because when you when you worked for the building as a janitor, first of all, Janice is right. It was a full time job, which means you went to work while the office workers were still there, which meant you had a relationship with them. Now you come to work at night after everybody who works in that office is gone. The second thing is you work for the building, which means if there's an opening in a little higher position, maybe doing maintenance on floors or maybe doing a little bit of glazing work on windows or something like that, you could be trained to do that. There was a way to have a bit of a career path, but once you contract out the cleaning to a cleaning service, it only works at night. You don't know anybody. You don't even know your your coworkers, because the cleaning surfaces, we learned, would go from floor to floor and inspect the floor and then sign the worker out and they would go down to the bus stop by themselves and then the next worker would come down. And so people then we were like an introduction service. Susie, this is Betty. Betty works on the fourth floor. Susie works on the 18th floor, and they didn't know each other. So we had to introduce them at the bus stops and then get on the bus with them and ride and continue the conversation. Then I'd have the carry. Machado, who worked with me, follow me in her car and pick me up. And we take turns riding the number three bus out of downtown Baltimore so it would have more time to talk to people.

Speaker 1 [00:22:20] So just I just want to pick up on that a little bit, Janice. And one of the kind of arguments against the living wage you've described, both of you describe very powerfully this background conditions which set up these kind of poverty wage conditions. But one of the arguments against the living wage is that it goes against the market. Right. And so it kind of upsets the equilibrium of the system of the market. Can you outline this argument and how you challenged it and kind of what broader lessons can be drawn from the campaign about how we should understand this relation between here's the church is kind of figure in civil society acting. Some might call it a Mike Gecan called the third sector acting over and against the market sector and trying to kind of challenge its norms, challenge what was going on. So just the right for us a little bit about the arguments against the living wage and how it's kind of anti market equilibrium and then how you how you challenged that and what that tells us about religion, freedom, society and the market.

Speaker 2 [00:23:22] So basically, the crux of the argument is, is not just about an equilibrium wage. It's more that the really perverse argument was, well, if you raise that, if you raise the living wage, if you raise the minimum wage, this will lead to higher rates of unemployment because companies won't hire. And so the right was arguing that, oh, these people, they don't really care about this constituency because if they did, they wouldn't be fighting. And that's always been the argument that's been made right, is that you can't raise the minimum wage because then the equilibrium gets out of whack and the result is unemployment increases. So just a couple of things to sort of put on the table. There was a really important study that was done and really famous book that came out of it about the minimum wage that by Card and Kruger. And basically what it showed was that when you raise the minimum wage and in this case it was looking at the comparison between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, but it basically showed that if you raise the minimum wage, actually what happened was that others around also raised the minimum wage, that it didn't lead to higher levels of unemployment and that companies found ways to absorb the difference. And in particular, they were looking at restaurants. The difference was that traditional economists. Would model the relationship, what Card and Krueger did was they actually looked at real places and they actually studied what happened in a few labor markets. Right. And so I love to teach this case because it shows the difference between modeling in the abstract, which was sort of what was the typical approach of economists at that time versus economists who started actually looking at and finding that it was a much more complicated relationship. And so the other thing just to add to the story is that. When Reagan became president, he couldn't abolish the minimum wage. He couldn't, he couldn't he couldn't repeal the Fair Labor Standards Act. So he did the next best thing, which is he just didn't raise the wage for the eight years that he was president. And so a lot of what happened was that the minimum wage has never caught up. It's seven dollars and twenty five cents now. Right. And people kind of knew this. Right. You know, there was this. So when when Jonathan and when when when billed and the Solidarity Sponsoring Committee, we're talking about a living wage. I mean, everyone understood that. And most important, they were talking about a living wage for workers who were connected in some way to the city of Baltimore. Right. So the idea was that the city should not be subsidizing substandard conditions and that really made sense to people.

Speaker 1 [00:26:08] So that that sense of that actually someone someone's still paying and nobody is the taxpayer who's essentially subsidizing substandard wages among companies. So it's going on somewhere. And it's just the question of why should the why should taxpayers subsidize these these kind of low wages?

Speaker 2 [00:26:27] Well, it was more than that. It was it was it was confusing a market argument here. In other words, when we targeted contracted out city workers, because that's where the real focus started to become on the campaign and why? Well, number one, those jobs were pinned down. If you go organize a little book bindery in Baltimore and you raise the wages, it can move away and does all the time and frankly, will chill and threaten your campaign by threatening to move away, even if it never does. But if you organize people who you cannot move Southern High School, it's going to be there and the people who clean it are going to clean it there. So one thing I learned as an organizer through the living wage campaign was that you had to organize capital that was pinned down. The second thing is that the market arguments didn't make sense because when the city let out contracts for cleaning high schools or for food service or for bus transportation, there was only one buyer and that was the city. There were numerous sellers, potential sellers, different contractors who might bid on that work, which means that you were automatically using a market example, lowering the wages down to the lowest level possible. So there was no market here. The market market arguments didn't

make sense, especially with city contract work. So there was only we had to make the market work in a sense, by by the city. What we finally understood in the campaign, I think the insight we had was that we had to have the city and the county and then later the state stipulate the wages in there, what you call in England, a big tender, what we call a request for proposal. So you had to have the wages stipulated there because otherwise the competition, because there were unlimited numbers of sellers of low wage services and only won by a big buyer, the city or the state, it was going to lower the wages so the contractors could compete. The second thing we understood is that the we had to change the idea that the work belonged to the workers. So what really made the living wage campaign in Baltimore different than many of his successor campaigns? And Janis's right. We didn't know we were starting a movement when we started one. We just knew we were good doing good local organizing. But it really it did catch the imagination of a lot of people. But they only did part of the campaign. They did the wage part of the campaign. And often through advocacy, what we were trying to do is really two or three things, really more than three things simultaneously. One was to say the city as a buyer of services, had to stipulate the wage because it couldn't be done by the market. Second, the work done by those workers had to belong to the workers, which means they had to have a first right of refusal for the job if their contract employer lost the job and a new one bid on it and got it, because otherwise they could fight for the living wage, get the wage up to a decent level, and then just have another contractor come in at a lower wage or some other workers gain from all that. And they don't aren't the beneficiaries of all the organizing they did. And the third thing we did was we had the city through its board of estimates, which was kind of like the the executive board that did the contracting out, say that any contractor that violated the National Labor Relations Act could be barred from. Sitting on future work that turned out to be really important because it made contractors behave in a way that that private sector contractors typically don't behave when it comes to breaking the National Labor Relations Act and busting unions. So we did those three things simultaneously set the wages and the wages. We came up with the idea that a one worker working full time should be able to bring a family of four above the federal poverty line. And I'll take credit for that. I came up with that. And the reason why I did it was that you wanted the you wanted to take away the argument of the opposition and you wanted to go for that suburbanite who's just opening up the Baltimore Sun and saying, well, that's right, if you work full time, you shouldn't be poor. So we wanted it to to have that ring to it. And that that turned out to be quite effective.

Speaker 1 [00:31:11] So you've got you've got your strategic analysis. You've you've built these relationships. You've heard these stories. You've got this very in depth strategic analysis of kind of what's at stake and how to address it. And crucially, you've got this sense then of if you if you're going to focus the organizing work, it has to be focused on people employed by the city or the state because it that anchor's capital in place. It can't move

Speaker 2 [00:31:35] and it's worked. We worked on private sector, too, but but the center of it was and the membership, the largest membership for what Janice was talking about, the Solidarity Sponsor Committee, which was. Our organization of workers, I checked the numbers prior to this at one point or another of fifteen hundred workers, had paid some dues to the Solidarity sponsored committee. So the problem, it was really difficult to maintain membership, but we got fifteen hundred Low-Wage Workers at one point or another to pay dues to the Solidarity Sponsor Committee. And it became part of build just like a church. As part of build. We have member churches, institutions. The Solidarity Sponsor Committee became a member institution of BUILD and was responsible for a number of years for a large portion of the turnout of the umbrella organization.

Speaker 1 [00:32:27] So just just on that. So one of the things about the campaign was this involved a coalition of labor and religion. And so this kind of was genuinely broad based form of of organizing. Janice, how unusual was that? Was this innovative aspect of the campaign, this Labor Religion Coalition, or was this kind of par for the course?

Speaker 2 [00:32:50] What was innovative about the coalition was that it went beyond the rent collar kinds of ways that in general unions would when they were in the middle of an organizing drive, they would try to find a priest or a rabbi or imam or whatever that would come and kind of bless the campaign. They never really did or they seldom really went deep with those organizations. Right. And so I would say that the difference was that the whole the whole approach was. They were in deep relationship with these churches, the churches there were working backwards through the people they cared about their their congregants. Right. And the people that they were only seeing on that Jonathan used to call it, there was the Sunday church and then there was the Monday through Saturday church, which was the people who came using the services of the church. And so the the difference was that it wasn't like a coalition of leaders, of just of leaders of of kind of do gooders saying showing up at a picket line. It was a serious commitment to use the power of the church and the power of the union to organize these workers together. I would say that what was so remarkable about it was the depth of relationship between the labor movement and and the church, and that that was the essence of what the IAF and build kind of made available, made possible. But the other thing I just say is that the other difference was that. What what what Bill was doing was moving an incredibly innovative, brilliant set of policies that were changing the discussion across the country, not just living wage, but, as Jonathan mentioned, the right to refuse, the right to organize at the municipal level. These were unheard of, right? Nobody was doing this. So it was like, you know, I used to think of it as when you watch an ice skating thing and somebody goes, oh, my God, that was a triple axel into a double whatever. Right. You know, what these guys did was like one brilliant policy move after another while they were also organizing workers and trying to organize a union unions with these workers and trying to get a handle on on what those strategies could look like. And so and then the other thing was that they were. They were. They were talking to child care workers, they were talking to janitorial workers, they were talking the bus drivers, they were talking to the workers that worked in the stadium at Camden Yards. Right. Like they were they were piecing together the story so that they were you know, this was a time when welfare reform was being moved on the national level by the Democrats. Right. By Clinton. And so they were fitting the pieces together. And in a way, once they did it, it was so obvious. But before they did it, it wasn't.

Speaker 1 [00:35:57] So this is kind of interaction then between the very granular, rooted in the living experiences of people on the ground and this broader analysis, this broader sense of the policy environment, the kind of broader debates that are going on and how the organizing work is connecting these in very creative and but but you can't get one. You can't have one without the other, as it were. Just just just the policy stuff is going to get you there. And just the kind of granular engagement is going to get you that you've got to have the two together. So, Jonathan, just just on that, let me ask you, there's a key distinction in organizing between issues and problems, living wage. You've kind of broken down through the strategy, through hearing these stories. You've identified an issue. Can you just tell us a little about that distinction and how it played out and why it mattered in the context of this campaign?

Speaker 2 [00:36:47] Well, I think Janice is describing it. We kept the two things in tension. So the problem was working in poverty and the degradation of wages and the

using of the market to push wages down and the use of privatization schemes and other things to push wages down. So that's a problem. We broke it down into a series of issues. In other words, Governor Glendening, will you sign an executive order saying that the office buildings cleaned by private contractors have to pay our living wage? So that's the problem is still there. But you break it down and make it issue, appeal to a particular governor and then you chase them all over Annapolis, Maryland, trying to get them to do it. So and then he commits to doing it. So it has the classic components of an issue. It has got a target. It's got a demand. It's got people mobilized for it. You polarize the whole thing, are you for or against us? But the problem is still there when the problem is that wages in Baltimore and in Maryland generally, but Baltimore, the United States generally and the Western world generally are too low. And so you don't you don't turn the problem. You you make examples of the problem and an example where you can actually do something about it. There is a yes or no. You're either for us or against us. The other thing I just going back to your question about problem to an issue. If you talk to these workers, they thought that they were in this situation because of their own fault. And a huge moving part of what Solidarity sponsoring committee did was that it gave people an alternative understanding of how they got into the situation they were in and and that it wasn't hopeless. Right. The most important piece of turning a problem into an issue was getting people to stop privatizing the blame and taking it on for themselves and seeing that it was structural, right. That it was political, that it was economic and that and that they didn't do anything wrong. You know, that larger forces were at work. Right. And that they needed to to build a power vehicle of their own in order to take on those those larger forces. And I'll just say there was this moment in the campaign I'll never forget when we were at an action, it was I think it was a union organizing action. I saw this happen twice, but it was it one was in a in a and taking on the governor around welfare reform. But the other was union organizing, where the ministers and the nuns sort of stood up, pointed their finger and said to the low wage workers who are organizing and fighting for a union, and these companies were throwing everything they could after them. They said, we stand with you and we will indemnify you, you know, and we will protect you. And literally, everyone stood up and put their arms around. And so, you know, there were moments like that of, you know, kind of a right that was, you know, community and church and union in an. Turbo charged faith. So that was, you know, I mean, you could just, you know, everyone was shaking and weeping, right? That was the power of of this work.

Speaker 1 [00:40:37] So that that there's something very profound there in that that if everyone can break down a problem into an issue and actually you it's it's both giving a sense of agency, here is something we can do something about. It's giving people hope. And then through that, there's this actually this. The possibilities of a new connection, solidarity and community emerging around that, and I think that's often missed, we get caught up in the kind of mechanics of campaigns, but that sense of the reweaving of a of a of the possibilities of ways of shared life together come through that because suddenly we can address this issue together. We're not just rendered passive by this massive by this massive problem.

Speaker 2 [00:41:21] Yeah, Janice is right. They had stopped blaming themselves for the systemic problem, but they were now there were felt they were kind of called to do something about it. And that was exciting to watch.

Speaker 1 [00:41:31] Can I dig into a little bit of the practicalities then of the campaign and what happened where and when? And so just talk me through some of the different kinds of action the campaign involved and the sequence they came in and some of the rationale of why you ordered them in the way you did.

Speaker 2 [00:41:48] We did a number of different types of actions. Now, there were all actions in that they brought people together. Typically, there was a target. There was a little bit of tension involved and there was a reaction that we were looking for. But the first of these was very, very much internal to build. In other words, build build was largely made up of Protestant and Catholic churches. Many of these churches did a lot of social service in the community for very poor people who didn't necessarily sit in their pews on Sunday, but who who did who did come to the church during the week. And so we took actions like at the soup kitchen held on a Wednesday. We would get a small team of people who would go around and sit down at the tables of the people who were using the soup kitchen and talk to them. And what we learn from that is that a large percentage of the workers, the beneficiaries of the soup kitchen, were working sometimes full time, but just for very low wages. I remember one worker was sitting there. He says, let me tell you about my strategy around calories. And I said, your strategy around calories. He said, yeah, I have two children. I come to two of their three of these soup kitchens a week and I try to get as many calories inside me as I can so I don't take up as much of the food at our family table. Right. Well, that the reaction was on the church members listening to that by saying, what are we doing here? We thought we are beating this guy, but we're really, in a sense, making it possible for his employer to pay him horrible wages and what are we doing? And so it created a created a lot of feeling. We would I would take members of the build churches with me downtown to talk to custodians. And we bought a great big that that we made served hot tea on cold nights down at the bus stops and people would linger and talk to us about their lives and their work. And the hot nights became kind of a staple inside of the build organization and everybody would talk to each other. Have you been on a hot night? And and it created a buzz inside the organization. But the target for that action wasn't the workers so much as it was the leaders of the organization themselves.

Speaker 1 [00:44:23] So there's a sense in which they they don't kind of understand the nature of the situation existentially in their own it and then. Right. So, again,

Speaker 2 [00:44:33] and frankly, get angry about it. All right. To get really angry about it. They start to these these people are not just workers now. It's Suzy and it's Fred. And it personalized this, that and it changes things. And so it created and created a demand inside of the built organization to tackle this issue, which wasn't totally there at the beginning of the campaign. So the first the first target was really internal inside a build to build up that understanding. And part of it was done around just popular education and teaching the about the economy. And we would have workshops where people would go around the room and and talk about what their grandparents did for a living and what their parents did for a living, which was often industrial work, what they did for a living, maybe, maybe for the build leaders. A lot of them were schoolteachers or social workers or other thing. And then how much trouble their kids were having getting started. They were roofing part time and living in mom and dad's basement and they didn't have health insurance. And so there was a real understanding how the economy and the workplace had changed.

Speaker 1 [00:45:39] So there's a kind of stage conversation there. You literally frame it in terms of people's actual experience where they're right. But to help them then get an understanding of the broader changing patterns of work and a broader account of the economy, not in some kind of abstract data, not

Speaker 2 [00:45:56] an abstract, but in their own lives. And then and then brought it back to why or then why, with part time and contingent and no benefit work was the traditional model of unionization having so much trouble in actually addressing that problem.

Speaker 1 [00:46:12] So then you would teach off the back of that about the changes in the economy and such

Speaker 2 [00:46:16] and then hand out handout statistics. But the statistics at that point were rooted in their own stories and their own experiences they shared with each other.

Speaker 1 [00:46:24] So we had the internal actions on the congregations and to build relationship between membership of the congregations and the workers. And then there were can you just also say a little bit about then the directions to build or build confidence among the workers as well?

Speaker 2 [00:46:40] Well, the workers we were trying to organize hadn't had a lot of experience in organizing organized organization of any kind. And there were some of them that were sitting in the pews of a church on Sunday, but not that many. If they did go to church, they went to a small storefront, churches and others that that were not members of the of the build organization and. And so they had to experience the power you feel when people come together. So we did actions, many of them in the basement of Union Baptist Church, where we would try to assemble the first 20 than 40 than 70, 80 low wage service workers in the city who had never met each other and would they'd come together and we would have actions. And again, the reaction was back on them and there was often be a proposal for a task. Could you host a meeting at the McDonald's near your work prior to work? Could you pull together three or four people to talk about the organizing? And people would make commitments and oftentimes honor those commitments, but they made commitments not to me or the other organizers. They made them to each other. And so we are trying to create a situation where people felt an obligation or an encumbrance to one another. And as beginning to build this what we call the Solidarity sponsored committee, which was the workers organization. So those were internal actions. Right then there were actions that had to be done because we had to create the political space where people felt they were free to organize. So we had some employers who got wind of the fact that their workers were going to meetings and didn't like it. And and that meant that the bill leaders had to take that on. They couldn't take that on themselves. The workers couldn't. They felt very vulnerable. So the first big action we did was at Knox Presbyterian Church on the east side of Baltimore in a very, very rough neighborhood where almost it's the neighborhood that the wire people. If your listeners are familiar with that, the wire was really set in this neighborhood. And we set up the church such that the members of Build, through their religious institutions were sitting in kind of a horseshoe shape with a big opening in the middle and then the solidary sponsoring committee workers who have been organizing for quite a few months. We have we were able to get about one hundred and fifty hundred and seventy five. I don't want to exaggerate. It was no more than that in the fellowship hall, right behind the sanctuary. And at the appropriate moment, the double doors opened between the two rooms and the workers march in and sit almost to, if you can imagine, embraced by the church. And this Jannis kind of described one of those actions where the workers felt the presence and protection and indemnification of the church, but we did a whole series of those kinds of actions where people could feel the presence of the church because they were scared, they were frightened. And why wouldn't they be excuse me? They they needed these jobs. They were crummy jobs, but they needed them. And I remember being in that meeting and going up to Reverend Dobson, and I'm saying to him, look, I've been out in the crowd, Reverend Dobson, the workers are still scared. He says, Jonathan, I'll take care of it. You had this low voice. It's a wonderful thing. And he had worn his robe that night because I asked them to. He doesn't even like to wear it, but he was worn his robe and he gets up in front of everybody. And the TV

cameras were in that space between the front pews and the altar. And he looks at the TV cameras and he orders them to move closer to him. And obediently they do. And he looks at the camera and he says, I've got a message for corporate Baltimore. You keep your hands off these workers do not smoke them. Do not write them up. Do not punish them. Then he takes his finger and he points because they are the children of God. And he points at the crowd. I thought lightning was going to come out of his fingers and everybody gets chills. And that was the power of this thing. And so we had to back off the employers. You know, the government wasn't going to do it through the National Labor Relations Act. We knew that that hadn't worked in decades. So we had to become our own enforcement for labor rights. And the build leaders love these actions. They really enjoyed them. And they were fun. They were funny and fun

Speaker 1 [00:51:30] that to that sense of then that move the movement from internal and internal actions where the reaction is the kind of membership and the workers to these forms of direct action to create space for organizing in things like hotels where

Speaker 2 [00:51:46] the target is the management of the hotel, where the ownership of the hotel. We did an action around the draft, the suit, the NFL draft was being held in Baltimore and we that was too big a target to pass up. And so both now, this was by this point, we had workers and church members working together and they had gotten to know each other and trust each other. And so now they're doing together. And we leafleted all the hotels with envelopes that says your housekeeper is not paid a living wage. I mean, if you care about that, you'll give you'll fill out this card and give it to management when you check out. And if you care about that, you'll put five bucks in the envelope and give her a little tip. And people that both that both those things. All right. And so they're they're the target was the hotel owners. But we use the patrons to deliver the message.

Speaker 1 [00:52:44] So that's a good sign. That's where there's a certain kind of political creativity and imagination in. How do you how do you act to get the reaction from you want, but you've got to be creative and inventive in that coming up with those kinds of tactics.

Speaker 2 [00:52:58] And some of them the organizers come up with, some of them, the workers themselves, came up with the ideas and they had a great sense of humor about it. They understood that the action had to be feel safe. There had to be a little bit sometimes a little bit of ridicule involved, you know, made it funny. And that the target of the ridicule is a person who's usually ridiculing you. But in another setting. Yeah. So, you know, we went we went after the employers. The biggest actions as far as the living wage was really I describe it as kind of a bank shot in pool, you know, where you can't aimed directly at the ball. You've got to bank it off the table to get to to get to the edge of the table, to get to the ball. And that's was we're going after the employers, but we couldn't go directly at them. So we went to them through. The government officials who they depended on for contracts, right, and that's what their living wage really was about, the actual bill itself was saying, no, we can't force you to pay a living wage, but will force the city to stipulate the wage in the in its bid tender or its request for proposal, and that those were tense because those were going after public officials where we had another agenda and build maybe around housing or something else, schooling or housing or something else. And we had to use some of our chits who had to use some of our political capital in putting tension on those public officials.

Speaker 1 [00:54:29] And what those those were public assemblies where you've got one thousand people.

Speaker 2 [00:54:36] We'll bring together a thousand people and

Speaker 1 [00:54:38] you get the public official on the stage. And it's a kind of yes or no. You know, if

Speaker 2 [00:54:41] you set it up, though, first you set it up with stories. So, you know, it's two or three workers talking about how hard it is to live on a minimum wage salary in Baltimore or the fact that they used to have a decent public job, but it was privatized. Then you lay out what you want, the government official, the elected official, the mayor, the city council person, whoever. But it's going to be a person who can actually say yes to you. But see, that's the mistake, that what differentiates an action from a demonstration or some other public activity is that you actually are trying to get a specific reaction. And the person offering that up has to actually have the power to do it by

Speaker 1 [00:55:32] who you've identified through prior research actions, power analysis, building relationship three one who wants to get an order?

Speaker 2 [00:55:39] It's common knowledge that they can buy it sometimes. It doesn't take that much research. You know, it's common knowledge that the mayor of the Baltimore puts together the city budget and chairs the the committee that actually lets out major contracts. And so we had these what would classically people talk about as two microphone actions where where the whole tension is set up and then a leader, oftentimes the person that the mayor might know, I my favorite one was with Bishop Miles. Doing the pinning was a great story. The mayor had previous and a previous action of about four or five hundred people said he thought it was illegal to do a living wage bill. That was a violation. It was preempted by federal labor law. It wasn't. So we did a whole bunch of research and we proved to him in a in a basically and a dossier, no, no, you have the power to do this. And so he comes up to one microphone and Bishop Myles's at the other and Bishop Miles never told me he's going to do this. And sometimes you can't teach this stuff. Somebody's got somebody's got to have a sense of theater and drama he takes the church was in in Baptist Church and they just installed new red carpeting right up there at the around the front of the church. And he takes a piece of chalk. And it goes halfway between the two microphones and he draws a chalk line on the brand new red carpet

Speaker 1 [00:57:08] and using his stuff

Speaker 2 [00:57:10] goes back to his own microphone. He says, Mayor Schmoke, there's two sides to this issue. There's our side. And our side says that if you work. You shouldn't be poor, and if you work for the city, you definitely shouldn't be poor. And that we need to pass a bill that ensures that that's our side and your side says no, that might affect the market too much or hurt your political position in the city or not appeal to more conservative voters the next time you run for office. So we can't afford to do that by. So there's two sides here, we're right, you're wrong. He's he walk miles, walks over to the line, stays on his side. He says, Mayor Schmoke, come over here and he walks over. He takes Mayor Schmoke by the hand. And he pulls that and he says, come over to our side and the mayor pulls back

Speaker 1 [00:58:14] over

Speaker 2 [00:58:15] and there it must have been. I don't know how long this drama was taking place, I'm in the back of the room with my jaw hung open. I'm looking around the

room. Everybody is sitting on the edge of their seats, staring at this drama taking place in front of them. And then Miles drops his hand. He says, Your Honor, you're not ready, but eventually you're going to see it our way, but you're not ready. And he sends them back over to his microphone and he closes. And prayer doesn't let the mayor speak anymore for the meeting. Wow. And everybody.

Speaker 1 [00:58:55] Exhales Yeah. But everyone knows exactly what's at stake and the nature of the political drama that's that's just, you know, just happened.

Speaker 2 [00:59:04] It was just played out in front of them. Yeah. It wasn't scripted. Right. Sometimes these actions can get too scripted. Yeah. We used to we didn't have a yes. We didn't it wasn't one of these actions where you've met with the mayor. You knew you're going to get a yes. You asked him a question and he says it would be my pleasure. No, no, no, no. This this drama was played out in front of everybody.

Speaker 1 [00:59:30] And there was real, real, real tension because often the I

Speaker 2 [00:59:33] was feeling it. I was in the room and I was feeling the tension. Oh, my God, what's he doing?

Speaker 1 [00:59:38] There's a nice, nice Segway there into this question of one. Obviously, one of the key rules in organizing going back to Alinsky is the action is in the reaction. How how are you able to act to get that reaction? How are you thinking about getting that kind of. Yes. From him in those actions?

Speaker 2 [00:59:56] Well, it's hard because he was loved inside the black church. He was the first elected black mayor of the city. You know, for a lot of people, there was just tremendous pride in his administration and, you know, and who he was. He's a Yale educated guy from Baltimore, you know, who played on the Yale lacrosse team and comes back to the city. He was he was he was just. You was married to a doctor. Oh, my God. He's the successor. He's Obama before Obama. You know, he's he's so popular in many ways. And we had to put we had to work to a lot of internal work to get our leaders inside a build to be willing to put the kind of tension on him that would that he'd react to. And he's being told he's he has aspirations, we're told at the time, to run for governor of the state. And and he's being told, I'm sure, by his advisor, look, you don't want to get this close to the black church into labor or it's going to hurt your chances of getting a nomination for them. So he he was we put him in a tough spot and we got a reaction from him. He ultimately came out on the right side, but it wasn't without a lot of tension.

Speaker 1 [01:01:04] Just want to return to the kind of conflict issue a little bit. And, you know, obviously we live in a very polarized context. And so, you know, while conflict is necessary to change, you have to learn to live with conflict. Tension is key, part of generating meaningful change. I think one of the other contrasts I certainly I've learned in from the IAF and organizing more broadly is that, as Alinsky puts it, kind of compromise is also a beautiful word. And this move from polarizing to depolarizing. Can you just talk us a little bit through Chinaski, starting with you, like talks a little bit through that move to depolarize. So we've heard already how the mayor then becomes an advocate for the living wage. And I certainly saw that in the London context where we polarized against the mayor who then became an advocate for the living wage and as did a number of bank heads of banks and corporate leaders. So that what's at stake in that move from polarizing to depolarizing, because it's a lot of politics, particularly on the left, which only polarizes

and the managers are only ever enemies and the capitalist classes are only up in a not. So you can just talk us through a little bit about that, the importance of people

Speaker 2 [01:02:13] realizing I teach organizing every other semester at Rutgers. And so I you know, I have mostly young people who come in who are in the blush of, you know, the Black Lives Matter movement or sunrise and climate change and all that stuff. And the first time they hear some of these ideas like Polarize and Polarizer, that you should never back a target into a corner without an exit, without an option that you know. And what I wanted to say is the other thing that I do as the class is built around role play, I want those organizers to have the experience of being the target. Because when you've had that experience of being the target, you know what a mighty, mighty weapon you have in your hand with organizing. And you better be judicious about it and you better not make it personal. Right? Target is always a who, not a what. We know that we have to target. We have to choose a target very specifically. But on the other hand, it's not about cursing them out personally. It's not about impugning their personal integrity, and I think that that that's like a part of it. And the the the idea of no permanent friends, no permanent and all that sort of stuff. Right. That I think that those ideas are evergreen. Right. They're really important ideas. And I saw it in my own community organizing career over and over again, that the bank president that we'd beat the crap out of one year would then be contributing to our to our annual banquet and we'd be lifting them up at the event. Right. That like, you know, that that that that that was the work that we were trying to rebuild. A functional, equitable. Economy and some of these players, we're going to see them again, right, and that if you just beat the crap out of them with no respect, know they're going to you know, I've had that experience as an organizer where, like, you win the battle, but you lose the war because they are never, ever

Speaker 1 [01:04:17] going to deal with you. But in a sense, that's that's something one discovers in the struggle rather than, you presume, by a kind of ideological checklist that, you know, beforehand. We and certainly my experience you that that sense of discovering those who who are prepared to move from being enemies to friends and through who will undergo a change and then actually be an ally in something like a living wage campaign. You know, I might for all sorts of ideological reasons, thinks, oh, there's no hope with them. And then turns out they become a close ally and a friend, whereas other people you think, oh, they're going to be great. And you discover actually for all sorts of old reasons, they're very hostile and never change and always trying to undermine the work you're doing. And but I think part of the problem in the contemporary moment is. Because we're so hidebound by strict ideological frames of reference, we think we already know before we enter the room who's an enemy and who's a friend. It cuts both ways, the ideological rigidity, just because someone signed up to my package deal of, you know, on the environment or whatever doesn't mean they're going to be my friend in a fight over wages. And that's and that's the kind of that's the Jeff Bezos problem, that because he looks progressive on all sorts of issues, you assume he's the friend. But actually, when you get into the meaningful issue of, you know, a decent working conditions and decent pay, turns out he's the most vitriolic enemy. And so this cuts either way. It can we can presume enemies are enemies and friends who are really enemies are actually friend. And so that's part of the struggle is to get people to see who actually is against them. And then there's the discernment of will they change? Will they move and what do we need to move? How do we need to move and change in order to kind of get that make that change possible? But just just want to pick up then try go back to you. Like, how do you how do you know when you've won? How do you know when you need to compromise to secure a win?

Speaker 2 [01:06:18] Well, it was very difficult and we made mistakes. For instance, the building managers and owners offered us a deal we should have taken, they offered us a deal that we probably should have taken and we were a little too principled on that deal. On the other hand, when Schmoke, Mayor Schmoke, offered us a wage that I forget, the first the first wage was six something an hour or something. But going up to the living wage, we wisely took that deal. And we were roundly criticized for it because the first increment was not a living wage by any stretch of the imagination. And so and so the ratification of that offer was really difficult. And you have to you have to trust your enemy at that moment that they're serious, that the that the six dollars and 20 cents or whatever the you know, the minimum wage at the time was four and a quarter. And so the first increment of the living wage was going to be six dollars and 20 cents an hour. I think now I may be forgetting the exact sense, but roughly six, 20 and we knew that that was still people working for poverty. Yet we knew we had to take it because it was what we did. I think wisely was we put built into the campaign and to the bill with the city council, an annual review of the wages and a stair step that got us to the living wage. So making that deal and then ratifying that deal among the workers wasn't easy. Who do they have to trust? Well, the first the first group they have to trust was the bill of leadership, who was proposing that we should take it, that this was the best we could do based on the amount of power we had at the moment versus the power out of power opposition. And that this was this was a good deal and should ratify it. Now, I've been a union organizer in one form or another for a long time, and ratifying a contract is always filled with this because you never know. It's always going to be some version of a compromise. And so so the training that goes in with the leaders ahead of time where there's an honest appraisal of the amount of power you have and the amount of power your opponents have. So what's a good contract? What's a good deal? A good deal is one that properly reflects the relative power between the two organizations. What's a bad contract or a bad deal? Well, that's one where you left a lot on the table. You've had a lot more power than you and you didn't use at all to get what you could have gotten. And what's a great contract? Well, that's when you fool them. And I think they have more power than you do. But and that happens, too. But not as often. Unfortunately, I

Speaker 1 [01:09:15] just don't own the organizing front. So so one of the things sometimes talked about in organizing that you you build up power through building relationships, through popular education, work, through leadership development and institutional development, and then campaigns spend power. Do you think that's true? I mean, down the street, do you think that's a true kind of accounting of things? And explain that a little bit for me.

Speaker 2 [01:09:37] Well, you know, the thing that was I think that's always true. And I think that there was a division of labor inside of the Build Solidarity sponsoring committee team of organizers. And so Jonathan was really leading the strategy. But there were brilliant organizers who were building the base of the of the workers. And so in my organizing, I always believe you want to come out stronger than you went in from a campaign in terms of your base. Right. But that's not going to happen if you don't bake it in. If you don't bakin recruitment and leadership development, strategic capacity, and you're not paying a lot of attention to to what's happening with the people who are coming into what their experiences. And so what I saw because I didn't just run with Jonathan, but I also got to know a number of the other organizers and to watch the work that they did with with with, you know, in recruiting new people and and developing them and the leadership development. You don't have to choose. Right. It's not like you campaign, campaign, campaign and then go back and build the base campaign campaign. Right. And a lot of organizations kind of do that.

Speaker 1 [01:10:50] So just let me kind of talk a little bit about the kind of afterlife of of the campaign it is. You've already both of you suggested, you know, in a sense takes on the form of a social movement. But I think by 2010, there were 125 cities and counties in the states who'd passed living wage ordinances, and then it had taken off Germany, Britain, Australia had kind of run initiatives inspired. They've been organizing work inspired by this. How did that emerge? Was it just spontaneous? And also, I guess I'm interested in you've hinted at this already, Jonathan. You know that inevitably in a kind of social movement form, there's going to be people who do the kind of deep organizing work and then others who kind of take the headlines and run with that. Was there was there a danger with a campaign like this that it gets routinized, that that it becomes a kind of banner that people march under but doesn't actually isn't isn't doing that kind of. Transformational change.

Speaker 2 [01:11:49] I think there was a mixture. There were some campaigns that were just liberal advocates advocating for a living wage in certain communities, and there's nothing wrong with that. I mean, people need a higher wage and there's nothing wrong with that. There were all the campaigns, I think, that were I think the one you participated Luke in London was a very, very deep campaign and really changed the city and certainly changed the community organization funded citizens that was sponsoring it, found leaders like yourself, leaders like Catherine have with leaders like Lina Jamoul, who I think is doing one of these podcasts. She was she was a leader in her university. Working on a living wage campaign, is now the director of a union in Minnesota. So I think I think you measure it, you know, in the kind of ways that it changes not just organizations and institutions, but, you know, creates leaders and and trains and develops people who then go on and do other wonderful things.

Speaker 1 [01:12:52] Jonathan Jannis, thank you so much for talking with me here today on the list and organize that podcast. It's been great to be with you for this rich and very compelling conversation, really. Thank you again for you for your time.

Speaker 2 [01:13:04] Thanks, Luke.

Speaker 1 [01:13:12] Thank you for joining me for this episode of the Listen Organize Act podcast in which I explored the role and nature of campaigns in organizing how they constitute a form of public action and what such public action involves if it's to win meaningful democratic change towards a more just and generous world. This podcast is a collaboration between the Industrial Areas Foundation and the Keenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. As with other episodes, you can download readings directly relevant to the episode from the website that's [ormondcenter.com backslash listen-organize-act](http://ormondcenter.com/backslash/listen-organize-act) podcast. Do sign up at the website for news about events and resources related to the podcast or to send me questions. But now let me say goodbye and I hope you join me next time.